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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 19, 1954, ~fr. and Mrs. Roland B. Smith of
Clearfield, Utah, together with Mr. and Mrs. Willia1n
Robins, 'vere killed in a private airplane crash in Denver,
Colorado. Roland B. S1nith was at the tin1e of death the
president and general rnanager of Sn1ith Frozen Foods,
Inc., and Box Elder Packing Corporation. He left surviving him four children, Roland J. Smith, age 25,
Ronald B. Smith, age 20, Kathleen May Smith, age 7,
and Michael Jay Smith, age 2. Mr. Milan D. Smith,
brother of the deceased, was duly appointed the guardian
of the estates and persons of the. last two named children,
and as such guardian filed claim with the Industrial
Commission of Utah for benefits under the vVorlnnen's
Compensation Act, naming as defendants, a1nong others,
the two corporations in which Roland B. Smith was
president and general manager.
On August 31, 1955, the Referee for the Industrial
Commission entered his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 'vherein he found, "that at the time of the
fatal accident, Roland D. Smith was engaged in his capacity of a general partner in the Smith Sales Company.
The only purpose of the trip was selling." On September
1, 1955, the Commission entered its order adopting these
Findings and therefore denying the clain1 of the minor
children of the decedent. A request for rehearing was
made but 'vas denied by the commission.
I 'V:ill atten1pt to prove in this brief first that there
are absolutely no facts in the record 'vhich will substan.;.
tiate such a finding, but that the same is based on pure
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speculation, conjecture and guesswork 1n the face of
uncontradicted evidence to the effect that the deceased
had nothing to do with the partnership "with the exception of being present occasionally on consultation meetings in regard to sales policy and determining of sales
policies, etc," (Emphasis added) and second, that a finding that the deceased was representing the partnership
does not negative the fact that the deceased was representing the corporations, and therefore the findings of
the Commission are fatally defective.
Before going into the evidence which was presented
to the Referee at the hearing, I would like to review the
organization of the Smith companies which are involved
in this controversy.
The Albert T. Smith family of Clearfield, Utah, has
for many years been engaged in the business of food
processing, canning and freezing. They had at the time
of the death of the decedent canning plants at four different locations. One at Clearfield, Utah, known as
Smith Canning Company, two at Brigham City,
Utah, known as Box Elder Packing Corporation and
Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., one at Le,viston, Idaho, known
as Sn1ith Frozen Foods of Idaho, and two at Pendleton,
Oregon, kno,vn as Sn1ith Frozen Foods of Oregon and
Smith Canning and Freezing. In addition to this the
family had a partnership kno,vn as Smith Sales Company, 'vhich acted as a sales brokerage in disposing of the
products of the six main corporations. This partnership
did not have the authority to sell products, but only to
take orders for eonfir1nation by the producing eompany.
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Said partnership was composed of the three brothers,
Milan D. Smith, Victor R. Smith, the deceased Roland
B. Smith, and one sister, Lavora Smith Wood.
Milan D. Smith was in charge of the plants at Lewiston, Idaho, and Pendleton, Oregon, as well as the Idaho
and Oregon operations of the partnership, Smith Sales
Company. He received a salary from each, including one
from the partnership. Victor R. Smith was in charge
of the Clearfield plant, and the Utah operation of the
Smith Sales Company. He also received a salary from
the corporation and from the partnership. No one other
than Victor and Milan was authorized to transact business for the partnership, and only then in their particular
areas.
The decedent was in charge of the two plants of the
corporations at Brigham City, Utah, and received a
salary from each, but he did not receive any salary, even
token salary, from the partnership, and had nothing to
do with the partnership.
Although the officers, directors and partners of the
various companies were substantially the same, and although they attempted to coordinate their activities, each
had its own officers, its own payroll, and its own integrated operations. The responsibility of each brother
was very .clearly defined, and each would have very little,
if anything, to do with the companies operated by the
other brothers, except in an advisory capacity on the
board of directors. It is very important that this fact
be borne in mind.
Box Elder Packing Corporation of Brigham City
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had packed a large tomato crop which was still in the
company's warehouse as another packing season approached. Sometime prior to April 19, 1954, the date
of the fatal accident, it was proposed that a trip be made
to the midwest, one of the principal purposes of which
would be to attempt to dispose of this tomato pack. In
addition to this, it was to be a general business trip,
and contacts other than selling were to be made, but no
one had discussed with the decedent the exact nature of
the business he intended to conduct, except that it was
known for sure that he intended to contact P.I.E. in
Chicago pertaining to freight rates on frozen Foods from
Utah to the Chicago area. Other stops which would be on
behalf of the corporations only were for purposes of
procurement of equipment and supplies, and a stop in St.
Louis if it could be worked in.
Mr. Bill Robins was the sales manager of the Utah
part of the partnership brokerage company working directly under Victor Smith and had discussed with Victor
in detail the stops which were to be made so far as sales
were concerned. He was going on the trip to represent
the brokerage con1pany, and his expenses were all being
paid by the brokerage company. He was going to be accompanied by the deceased, Roland B. Smith, who, as previously stated, 'vas the president and general manager
of the corporations w·hose products were to be sold. These
two 1nen, together with their wives, departed on their trip
early on the morning of April 19, 1954. In attempting
to take off from the airport at Denver, Colorado, something happened to the plane and it crashed, killing aU
four occupants. The sole question then becomes, "Was
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the deceased Roland B. Sn1ith representing the corporations at the time of the fatal accident'"
POINT I
EVEN IF IT IS ADMITTED THAT THE ONLY PURPOSE
OF THE FATAL TRIP WAS TO DISPOSE OF A TOMATO
PACK, WHI·CH WE CON'TEND IS NOT THE CASE, IT DOES
NOT F'OLLOW THAT THE DECEDENT WAS REPRESENTING THE PARTNERSHIP AND THE PARTNERSHIP ONLY
AT THE \TIME OF THE ACCIDENT.

It came as a complete shock to all of the Smiths and
their attorney when the Commission found that the deceased, Roland B. Smith, was representing the partnership at the time of the accident, because in fact he had
nothing to do with the actual operation of the partnership
and had no authority to transact business on behalf of the
partnership, and these facts are clearly shown in the
record. In the light of the decision I again read the
Transcript to see what facts the Referee relied on in
reaching his conclusion. The only two things that he
could rely on are (1) That the deceased was a general
partner in the Smith Sales Company, and (2) One of
the primary purposes of the trip was to dispose of a tomato pack. Neither of these facts speak directly and say
what the actual facts were, but only inferences can be
drawn therefrom, and inferences should only be used
when there is no direct evidence on the question, which is
not the case here. True the partnership agreement said
that he was to "diligently apply himself or herself in the
business of the said partnership," but did he do so' All
the testimony in the case clearly says, "No." On the other
hand, the partnership agreement stated that Victor R.
Smith was to be the general manager, which he was.
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Also, the amendments to the partnership agreement show
that during the year from April, 1947, to April, 1948, the
deceased had only an $800 investment in the partnership,
and his investment fluctuated from time to time. Can it
be said affirmatively after reading the articles of copartnership and without further proof that the decedent
was representing only the partnership on this trip~
The fact that one of the principal purposes of the
trip was selling is just as inconclusive as the partnership
agreement. Let us assume for the sake of argument that
the sole purpose of the trip in question was selling. vVhat
were they going to sell~ The tomato pack of Box Elder
Packing Corporation. ~Ir. Bill Robins, Sales Manager
for the Utah part of Smith Sales Company, was going
to go and there is no question but that he was to represent
the partnership. All of his expenses were paid by the
partnership. He had made careful plans for the trip with
Victor Smith, whom the record clearly shows was the
only 1ne1nber of the partnership in the Utah area who had
any actual authority to act for the partnership aside from
the authority imposed by law to protect third parties.
So far as Robins was concerned, this was a selling trip.
One other man "~as to accon1pany Mr. Robins. We subInit by way of argtuuent that had the product to be sold
been that of the Idaho or Oregon corporations, Milan
D. Smith 'vould have been the second 1nan. Had the product to be sold been that of Sn1ith Canning Con1pany of
Clearfield, Victor R. Smith would have been the second
man, and the reasoning is obvious. The fact is, the prodnet was the to1nato pack of Box Elder Packing Corporation~ a.nd so Roland B. Smith was the second man. We
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sub1nit further that in all of these three argumentative
examples the second man would have been selected to
represent the corporations over which they had supervision and control, and not the partnership. This would
be true although Milan and Victor were also the general
managers of the partnership in their respective areas.
Combine these facts with the fact that the record clearly
shows that Roland B. Smith had virtually nothing to do
with the partnership, and you reach the only logical
result that Roland B. Smith was representing the corporations, not the partnership, on this fatal trip.
The record shows the defendant's relationship to the
partnership. For example, when the witness, Victor R.
Smith, 'vas asked what work the deceased perfonned in
connection with the partnership, Smith Sales Company,
he replied:

"A. Well, he had very little to do so far as Smith
Sales was concerned, with the exception of
being present occasionally on consultation
meetings in regard to sales policy and determining of sales policies, etc." Transcript page
29, line 28.
Also on line 29, page 62 of the Transcript, we find the
following:
"Q. Did Roland have anything to do with the
operation of Smith Sales Company~

A.

By that you mean with the actual management?
Q. That is right, actual operation of the company.
A. No, except as a consultant, in the consulting
capacity, I should say."
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And on cross examination by Mr. Christensen the witness stated:
"A.

Q.

The management of the partnership was restricted to my own management in Utah and
that of Mr. Milan Smith in Pendleton.
vVhen you say 'the Inanagement' you mean
the detailed supervision, the day to day operation~

A.

Yes. That is there was no one else in the
partnership authorized to transact business
except the two of us, and only then in these
particular areas." (Emphasis added) Transcript page 64, line 18.

Also the witness ~1elvin Stephenson when asked the
question, "Did he (Roland B. Smith) actually perform
any functions in connection with the partnership, other
than in his advisory capacity as a partner," responded,
"Not that I know of." In the face of this testimony, and
nothing in the record to the contrary, how can it be
said that the decedent "Tas representing the partnership
and the partnership only at the time of death~ It appears
that the Industrial Com1nission is placing him in this
capacity at the time of the accident for the first tin1e in
the history of the partnership, and without one scrap of
evidence to warrant their doing so.
In addition to the above testin1ony we have the further fact in the record that both ~Iilan D. Smith and
'Tictor R. S1nith received salaries fro1n the partnership,
bnt the decedent received absolutely none. On the other
hand, he received a salary of $190.75 every two weeks
frq1n Sn1ith Frozen Foods, Ine., and $163.50 every two
'veek~ :fron1 Box Elder Packing Corporation. These
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salaries continued up to and including the date of death,
and it is safe to assume that had he not been killed they
would have continued through the entire time he 'vas
on this trip. It is true that payment of wages alone is not
conclusive in establishing the relationship of employment, but it is circumstance which should be considered,
and the Commission has not done so. On this point see
the case of Ellegood v. Brashear Freight Lines, 162 S.W.
2nd 628, 236 Mo. App. 971 and cases cited therein. In
the case of Davis v. Julian, 107 P. 2nd 745, 152 Kan. 749,
the court stated:
"The fact he was paid wages tended to establish the relationship of employer and employee."
McKinstry v. Guy Coal Co., 116 Kan. 192, 225
P. 743, 38 ALR 837.
And in the case of Rojeski v. Pennington Dairy Fa·rmers, 192 A. 746, 118 N.J.L. 335 they indicated that the
manner and amount of payment for services rendered
are not controlling, but shed light on existence of employer-employee relation which will authorize award
under Workmen's Compensation Act.
Another very important factor, and one which has
virtually been. ignored by the Commission, is that the
decedent's expenses were being paid, not by the partnership whom the Commission has found he was alone
representing, but by the corporations 'vhose products
were to be sold. Victor Smith, who was the only man
authorized to write checks on the partnership account,
testified unequivocally that the decedent's expenses were
not being paid by the partnership, but on the contrary,
the decedent had drawn $200.00 from Smith Frozen
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Foods, Inc., for "travel expenses" and had taken three
additional blank checks which he had authority to execute, one on Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., and two on Box
Elder Packing Corporation. If the decedent had been
going to represent the partnership his expenses would
have been paid by the partnership. The fact they were
paid by the corporations is the strongest possible proof
that he was going to represent them. In the findings
of the Commission the only reference to this strong
evidence was rnade when they said, "Some evidence was
introduced that would tend to show that Box Elder
Packing Corporation underwrote a part of the expense.
This was supported by a photostatic copy of a check by
the corporation to Roland B. Smith designated "travel
expenses." "Tended to show~" Can there be any doubt~
They were paying his expenses, and this fact alone should
have resolved the issue once and for all. "\Vhen asked the
questions, "There were the t'vo parties going, Who was
to pay the expenses of the decedent Roland Smith~",
'Tictor Smith answered, "His expenses were paid by
Box Elder Packing Corporation." T-60, Line 23. There
can be no doubt but that the decedent was going on this
trip to represent the corporations. Furthermore there
was a cash receipt for gas purchased at Denver found
in the wallet of the decedent from which it could be inferred that he had purchased the gas. This is the type
of evidence which I would say "tends to show" that the
corporations 'vere underwriting part of the expenses of
the trip, but not clear unquestionable evidence such as
the faet he drew $200 from the corporation for "travel
expen~e~," ,,·hich ''Tould do 1nore than just "tend to show."
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There are still other factors which would show that
the deceased was representing the corporations 'vhich
have been ignored by the Commission. For example,
the packing season of a canning company is comparatively short, but still the decedent devoted over two-thirds
of his time throughout the year to the two corporations
in Brigham City. The record shows that he went to the
plants almost daily the year round. On cross examination
by Mr. Christensen Mr. Victor Smith testified:

"A. Well, during the balance of the year there
are three excellent operations. That is disposing of the product packed, repairing machinery and equipment preparatory for the
next season's pack, and making necessary contacts with growers and with suppliers to provide for the product and the material for subsequent years' pack." (Emphasis added.)
Also in the testimony of Mr. Melvin Stephenson, comptroller for the Smith companies, we find the following.
The witness stated:
"A. His (Bill Robins) purpose was to make contacts in connection with sales of merchandise
for the Smith Sales Company." Then I asked
the question :
"Q. Now, in connection with the transaction of
business for Smith Sales Company, would
the other companies be interested in the same
contacts so far as that business is concerned 1
Now for example, say they were going to contact a prospective purchaser in New York,
would Smith Canning Con1pany and Box Elder Packing Corporation be interested in that
operation?
A.

Very definitely.
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Q.

And why?

A.

Well, the welfare of the company depends
upon the movement of merchandise out of
the warehouse.

Q. In other words, not only would the Smith
Sales Company be interested, but the individual corporations from whom the products
were to be delivered would be interested in
the transaction also.
A.

That is correct."

And still another important point is that Smith
Sales Company did not have the authority to bind the
individual companies, but only acted as a brokerage for
the taking of orders which were not binding upon the
company whose products were being sold until accepted
by the company itself. This is born out by the testimony
of Victor R. Smith on cross examination by Mr. Christensen when he stated, starting at line 8, page 57 of the
Transcript:
"A.

Well, let me put it this way. A contact might
be made, but a sale couldn't be made without
being confirn1ed by the producing plant."
Where sales had to be confirmed by the producing company before a binding sale could be made it is only natural that the president and general n1anager of the
producing companies 'vould go along in order that the
sale u1ight be con1pleted at the very time of contact, and
in affir1ning the order and 1naking a binding sale the deeedent 'vould be representing the producing company
and not the partnership because only the producing companies had the authority to co1nplete the sale. Would
the Industrial Conunission have us believe that the de-
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cedent 'vas representing only the partnership during the
time they were flying fro1n place to place, but when they
were 1naking sales he stepped from that employment to
represent the producing company in confirming the sale?
Therefore, even assuming that the sole purpose of the
trip was to 1nake sales, the facts will not substantiate a
finding that the decedent was representing only the partnership and not the corporations at the time of death,
but at best could only 'varrant a holding that he was
representing both.

POINT II
ALTHOUGH THE FINDINGS OF THE REFEREE WERE
THAT "THE ONLY PURPOSE OF THE TRIP WAS SELLING'' THE RECORD SHOWS BY CLEAR, UNANBIGUOUS,
AND UNCONTRADI·CTED FACTS THAT THE ONLY PURPOSE OF THE TRIP WAS NOT SELLING.

At various places throughout the testimony there
were references to other things which were to be accomplished on this trip other than selling. I would like to
review some of them, starting on line 7, page 34 of the
T'ranscript. Victor Smith testified:
Well, as I have stated, it was in the nature of
a general business trip. There were sales contacts to be made, as well as contacts to be
made, as I mentioned this one on freight
rates, other possibly on equipment, procurement. It was just a general business trip."
On cross examination by Mr. Christensen starting with
line 7, page 50 of the Transcript we find the following:
"A.

"Q.

So that to the best of your knowledge, the
entire trip was for the purpose of sales 'vith
the exception of one contact in Chicago with
P.I.E., is that right ?
0
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A.

Well now, that is as far as the Smith Sales'
relationship to this thing is concerned. That
is, in other words-Let me put it this way.
Roland intended to make a number of calls
in connection with his part of the activities
but I didn't review those calls with him in
detail. I have no knowledge of them.

Q. You don't know what those calls
A.

were~

No. I had no occasion to review those with
him, St. Louis, for instance, was mentioned
as a possible call if they could work it in, and
I don't know what Roland's business would
have been iri St. Louis. As I say, I didn't discuss with Roland the details of his business."

In order to sustain their decision that the decedent
was representing the partnership and the partnership
only, they would have to find that the sole purpose of
the trip was selling, which finding they have made. In
order to do so, however, they have had to ignore the
uncontradicted evidence, which they do not have the right
to do in the absence of conflicting evidence. If other
business was to be done which did not concern the partnership, then it would follow that the decedent was representing the corporations. No one except the deceased
knew all of the business which he contemplated transacting. Suffice i~ to say, however, it was a "general business trip." A stop was contemplated in St. Louis, and
a "nurnber of calls in connection with his part of the activities," including the stop at P.I.E. in Chicago. These
facts have been cornpletely ignored by the Commission,
and had they not been so ignored, the award could not
have been denied. In the face of the above uncontradicted
evidence, the finding of the Referee as adopted by the
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Conn11ission that the only purpose of the trip was selling should not be allowed to stand.

POINT III
THE COMMISSION'S FINDING OF F'ACT THAT THE
DECEDENT WAS REPRESENTING THE PARTNERSHIP
DOES NOT RESOLVE T'HE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER HE
WAS REPRESENTING THE CORPORATIONS AND THE
FINDINGS ARE, THEREFORE, FATALLY DEFECTIVE.
LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION IN THE ·CASE OF JOINT
OR CONCURRENT EMPLOYMENT BY TWO EMPLOYERS IS
JOINT AND SEVERAL AND LIABILITY LIES WITH THE
CORPORATIONS ALTHOUGH HE MAY, AT THE SAME
TIME, HAVE BEEN REPR.ESENTING THE PARTNERSHIP.

Here again for the sake of argument I would like to
assu1ne a set of facts, which I strongly insist did not exist; namely, that the deceased was representing the partnership at the time of the accident. As early as 1929 in
the case of Murray v. Wasatch Grading Cornpany, 73 U.
430, 27 4 P. 940, this court held that,
"The mere fact that the plaintiff may have
been an employee of the railroad company at the
time he was injured did not necessarily preclude
him from also being an e1nployee of the defendant."
In the findings of the Commission in the ease at hand
they correctly stated the question and ultimate fact to be,
"Whether or not the deceased was an employee (of the
corporations) in the course of his employment at the time
of the fatal injury." The Findings and Conclusions then
go on to hold that he was working for the partnership.
But this does not answer the very issue 'vhich they themselves pose. Before the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of law will support a denial of the clairn they must find
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affirmatively and not by inference that the decedent was
not working for the companies who are being sued, and it
is not sufficient to find that he was working for someone
else.
Generally speaking a positive finding which is inconsistent with the ultimate fact which is to be determined will support the decision. For example, if the
ultimate fact to be proven or found is, "Did the decedent
die frorn a heart attack," this could be supported by a
finding that he died of cancer without an express finding
that he did not die from a heart attack. Where this
method is used, however, to support the finding of the
ultimate fact the two facts must be incompatable. That is,
if one is so, the other cannot be. This is not the case at
hand. The finding that the deceased was engaged in his
capacity as a general partner in the Smith Sales Company and that the only purpose of this trip was selling
does not negative the fact that he was also representing
and was the employee of the corporations, which is the
ultimate fact which must be determined. For this reason
the Findings and Conclusions of the Commission are not
sufficient to support the order denying compensation.
In the case of Rice v. Keystone View Co., 297 N.W.
841, 843, 210 ~linn. 227, they held that where a traveling
salesrnan was employed by two different companies to
represent them and sell their products, a.nd on morning
of fatal accident he was on his 'vay in his automobile
to demonstrate products of both companies, first the
products of the one company at one city, and then the
products of the other company at a different city, the em-
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ployment was ''concurrent e1nployment," and joint award
of compensation against both companies was correct.
Then in the case of Pacific E1nployer's Ins~trance Co. v.
Industrial Accident Com1nission, 136 P 2nd 633, 58 Cal.
App. 2nd 262 at page 637 we find the following:
"Where the facts support the finding of a
joint hiring of a work1nan by two or more enlployers, each employer beco1nes liable for colnpensation."

N. Y. Indemnity Co. v. I.A.C., 126 Cal. App.
37, 14 P 2nd 160;
Standard Ace. Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 127 Cal. App.
443, 11 P. 2nd 401;
Ragas v. I.A.C., 83 Cal. App. 313, 256 P. 487.
And again in Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp. v.
U. 8. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., (Ariz., 1945) 162 P. 2nd
609, page 614 we find the following:
"Where two or more persons are en1ployers
of the same employee engaged, as here, for the
com1non benefit of both, and so found and determined by the proper tribunal, their liability is
joint and common."

Frederick A. Stresenreuter, Inc., v. I.A.C.,
322 Ill. 187, 152 N.E. 548;
Sargent v. A. B. J(nowlson Co., 224 Mich. 686,
195 N.W. 810, 30 ALR 993;
Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Co,ntmission, 123 Cal. App.
443, 11 P. 2nd 401.
In Sgattone v. Mulholland &
341, 58 ALR 1463, they say:

Got~vals,

138 A. 855, 290 Pa.
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"Before a recovery can be had by the claimants, it must appear that the deceased was an employee. In determining this fact, it is immaterial
that he may also have been employed by a second
person."

Atherholt v. William Stoddard Co., 286 Pa~
278, 133 Atl. 504;
Garman v. Cambria Title Savings & Trust
Co., 88 Pa. Sup. Ct. 525.
In the case of Freedman v. Industrial Accident Commission, et al, (Calif.) 154 P. 2nd 922, page 925, in dissenting opinion it is stated:
"Since Freedman was found by the Commission to be an en1ployer of Ross, and a separate
award was rendered against him, it is immaterial
whether Freedn1an was the sole employer or merely a co-employer of the workman. In either event
he would be liable for the full amount of the
award."

Pacific Employers Ins. Co. r. I.A.C., 58 Cal.
App. 2nd 262, 136 P 2nd 633;
Standard .Accident Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 123
Cal. App. 443, 11 P 2nd 401;
N. Y. Ind Co. v. Industrial .Accident Commission, 126 Cal. App. 37, 14 P 2nd 160.

Also in Schaefer v. Industrial Cornmission, 185 Wis. 317,
201 N.W. 396, the court expressed the opinion that anyone of the employers at the time workman became incapacitated by the occupational disease would be liable
for the whole a1nount of the award. So we see the law
appears very clear that where employee was acting within scope of employtnent with two employers at time of
death, dependents are entitled to proceed under Compen-
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sation Act against either or both. Because of this it is
imperative that the Co1n1nission's Findings determine
the question ""\Vas he representing the corporations at
the time of the accident," and it is not sufficient merely
to find that he was also representing some one else.
POINT IV
THE COMMISSION IN FINDING THE DECEDENT WAS
REPRESENTING THE PARTNERSHIP AND THE PARTNERSHIP ONLY AT THE TIME OF INJURY HAS DONE SO
WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDEN·CE AND HAS
WITHOUT ANY REASON OR CAUSE, ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY REFUSED TO BELIEVE AND ACT UPON
THE CREDIBLE AND UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENC·E IN
THE RECORD.

I would_ venture to say that there is no other field
of law in which this court has spoken more often than
in regard to Workmen's Cornpensation. To review all
of the cases would be in1practical. Suffice to say that
the rule has been stated over and over again, that the
Supreme Court will not reverse a finding of fact made
by the Industrial Comission if there is a conflict in the
evidence and if there is substantial evidence which will
support the finding which they have made. I an1 keenly
aware of the extre1ne burden which this places upon a
claimant who is attempting to have a question of fact
set aside.
In the case of K avalinakis v. I~ndustrial Conunission, et al., 67 U. 174, 246 P. 698, decided in 1926, after
making a long argurnent on why the decisions of the
Commission pertaining to question of fact should not be
disturbed this court had this to say :
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"By what has been said we do not wish to be
understood as holding that there is no limit to
the Commission's power or authority in disregarding or in regusing to give effect to uncontradicted evidence. The Commission may not,
without any reason or cause, arbitrarily or capriciously refuse to believe and to act upon credible evidence which is unquestioned and undisputed."
This cost has been cited approvingly in over twentyfour Utah cases alone and has never been modified or
changed. It is the strongest possible case for the argument that their decisions are final but still the court
recognized the fact that the Commission can not disregard or refuse to give effect to uncontradicted evidence
or arbitrarily or capriciously refused to believe and to
act upon credible evidence. This we maintain and Commission has done in this case.
In the case of Rukavina et al. v. Industrial Comntission of Utah, et al., 68 U. 1, 248 P. 1103 decided in
1926 shortly after the Kavalinakis case we find the following:
"Still, like a court or jury, the conumss1on
is required to take as true undisputed or uncontradicted testimony or evidence, if not opposed to
probabilities or common knowledge, or not contrary to natural or physical la,v, or inherently
improbable or inconsistent with facts and circurnstances in evidenee, or uncontradictory in
itself, ~·"". In other words, the commission may
not, any rnore than a court or jury, arbitrarily
or capriciously disbelieve or disregard testimony
or evidence."
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In the case of Harness et al. vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, et al., 81 U. 276, 17 P. 2nd 277 the court
makes the following staten1ent:
"The testimony of the witnesses is remarkably free from conflict and has all of the characteristics of being truthful. Counsel for the defendants have not pointed out and are unable to
find anything in the testin1ony offered in behalf
of the applicants to justify disbeleiving the same.
It is the established law in this jurisdiction that
under our Industrial Act dependency and its extent are questions of fact for the deter1nination
of the Industrial Commission. This court may not
disturb the findings of fact made by the commission unless it appears that the commission has
applied an illegal standard, or has found a fact
without evidence to support it, or Jvas made a
finding against uncont~radicted credible evidence.
On an application to this court the question of
whether there is any evidence to support a finding of the commission, or whether there is any
justifiable reason for making a finding against
uncontradicted credible evidence, is one of law.

" *** In the absence of some reasonable basis
for disbelieving the uncontradicted evidence of· fered in support of an application for compensation, the commission may not disregard such evidenc£1." (Emphasis added)
This court 'vent on to annual the order denying compensation.
Once again in the case of Batchelor v. Industrial
Commission of [Jtah, 86 U. 261, 42 P. 2nd 996 this court
reiterated the above rule when it stated :
"Where the conunission has made its findings and conclusions and denied co1npensation, it
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is not for the court to disturb them unless it appears from the record that the commission has
disregarded competent evidence, substantial in
character and uncontradicted, without reasonable
basis therefor."
Kavalinakis v. I. C., 67 U. 174, 246 P. 698;
Hauser v. I. C., 77 U. 419, 296 P. 780;
Ostler v. I. C., 84 U. 428, 36 P. 2nd 95.

Before a finding of the Commission can be allowed
to stand it must be based upon substantial evidence. Just
what is meant by "substantial evidence" was decided in
the case of Milford Copper Co. of Utah, et al., v. Industrial Commission of Utah, et al., 61 U. 37, 210 P. 993
where they stated:
"As to what may or may not be regarded as
substantial evidence within the meaning of our
Industrial Commission act, and the procedure
under it, we think the meaning of that expression is aptly defined in 4 Wards and Phrases,
Second, p. 751, which reads :
" 'By "substantial evidence" is not meant
that which goes beyond a mere "scintilla of evidence," since evidence may go beyond ·a mere
scintilla, and yet not be substantial evidence.
must possess something of substance and relevant consequence and not consist of vague, uncertain, or irrelevant matter, not carrying the
quality of proof or having fitness to induce· conviction. Substantial evidence is such that reasonable men n1ay fairly differ as to whether it establishes plaintiffs case, and, if all reasonable men
must conclude that it does not establish such
case, then it is not substantial evidence. !"
Jenkins & Reynolds Co." v. Alphena Portland
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Cement Co., 147 Fed. 641, 643, 77 C.C.A.
625.
POINT V
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECEDENT WAS REPRESENTING THE CORPORATIONS AT THE TIME OF
DEATH IS A JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION TO BE DE·CIDED UPON A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE.

Generally speaking, questions of fact will be allowed
to stand if there is any substantial evidence to support
them as the term is defined under Point IV. I strongly
contend that there is no substantial evidence in this case,
and it is even more clear that a preponderance of the
evidence could or would not support the finding.
In the case of Miller v. Industrial Commission, 97 U.
226, 92 P. 2nd 342, this court stated :
"Whether Miller was employed by Farmington City and was therefore entitled to workmen's
compensation or was employed by Griffith is a
jurisdictional question which we must decide on
a preponderance of the evidence."

Weber Co.-Ogden City Relief Commission
v. l.C., 93 U. 85, 71 P. 2nd 177, Holt v. I.C.,
96 U. 484, 87 P. 2nd 686.
Justice Wolfe dissented on this point in a special concurring opinion, but the same proposition was reiterated
in the case of Stover Bedding Co., et al.,. v. Industrial
Commission, 99 U. 423, 107 P. 2nd, 1027, when this court
stated:
"The first question to be deter1nined is
whether Knudsen was an en1ployee of Stover
Bedding Co., or whether his relationship with
plaintiff was that of independent contractor. We
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have on several occasions held that such is a
jurisdictional question, which we must decide
upon a preponderance of the evidence."

Angel v. Industrial Commission, 64 U. 105,
228 P. 509;
Luker Sand N Gravel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 82 U. 188, 23 P. 2nd 225;
Norris v. Industrial Commission, 96 U. 484,
87 P. 2nd 686;
Miller v. Industrial Contmission 97 U. 226,
92 P. 2nd 342.
Justice Wolfe again dissented.
A preponderance of the evidence shows without a
doubt that the decedent was representing the corporations at the time of the fatal accident and the dependants
should be allowed benefits under the Act.
CONCLUSION
Roland B. Smith at the time of death was president
and general manager of Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., and
Box Elder Packing Corporation, both of Brigham City,
Utah. He went to the plants daily the year around and
devoted over two-thirds of all his time to the two corporations. He was charged \vith conducting the plant
operations, disposing the pack and procuring ne'v equipment and supplies. He received a salary from both corporations. At the tilne of death he was making a trip to
the Midwest to dispose of a tomato pack of these corporat 1ons, as '\Tell as to conduct other general business regarding procurement of equipment and supplies and
discussion of freight rates in Chicago. All of his expenses

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25

for the trip 'vere being paid by the~e corporations.
The Con11nission in reaching a clecision that at the
tin1e of death he was represe11tin~ the partnership has
co1npletely ignored all of these facts and has reached
its conclusion arbitrarily and capriciously without any
substantial evidence to support its findings. For thi~
reason and for the other reasons as ennumerated in this
brief, the order of the Commission denying the clailn
of the t'vo 1ninor children should be set aside.
Respectfully submitted,

REX W. HARDY
Attorney for Plaintiff
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